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This article was motivated by the conference entitled “Perception & Action – An Interdisciplinary
Approach to Cognitive Systems Theory,” which took place September 14–16, 2010 at the Santa
Fe Institute, NM, USA. The goal of the conference was to bring together an interdisciplinary
group of neuroscientists, roboticists, and theorists to discuss the extent and implications of
action–perception integration in the brain. The motivation for the conference was the realization
that it is a widespread approach in biological, theoretical, and computational neuroscience to
investigate sensory and motor function of the brain in isolation from one another, while at
the same time, it is generally appreciated that sensory and motor processing cannot be fully
separated. Our article summarizes the key findings of the conference, provides a hypothetical
model that integrates the major themes and concepts presented at the conference, and
concludes with a perspective on future challenges in the field.
Keywords: conference, embodiment, interdisciplinary, robotics, sensorimotor, perception, action
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Introduction
A widespread approach in biological, theoretical, and computational
neuroscience has been to investigate and model sensory function of
the brain in isolation from motor function, and vice-versa. At the
same time, it is generally appreciated that sensory and motor processing cannot be fully separated; indeed, recent findings in neuroscience
suggest that the sensory and motor functions of the brain might be
significantly more integrated than previously thought. The purpose
of the workshop on Perception and Action, held in September 2010 at
the Santa Fe Institute in Sante Fe, New Mexico, was to bring together
a multidisciplinary group of researchers to discuss the extent and
implications of action–perception integration in the brain.
The workshop was organized by Nihat Ay, Ray Guillery, Bruno
Olshausen, Murray Sherman, and Fritz Sommer. In addition to the
workshop organizers a diverse group of researchers spoke at the workshop: Ehud Ahissar, Josh Bongard, Andy Clark, Carol Colby, Ralf
Der, Keyan Ghazi-Zahedi, Jeff Hawkins, Christopher Moore, Kevin
O’Regan, Daniel Polani, Marc Sommer, and Naftali Tishby. The attendance of graduate students and post-doctoral researchers, who are the
authors of this article, was supported by travel grants from the Santa Fe
Institute. A complete list of participants and presentations can be found
on the conference web site: http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/events/workshops/
index.php/Perception_and_Action_-_an_Interdisciplinary_Approach_
to_Cognitive_Systems_Theory
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In this article, we summarize key findings presented at the workshop with a focus on (1) biological evidence for a strong integration
of perception and action in the brain and (2) the implications of
closed action–perception loops for computational modeling. We
also highlight some of the recurring themes that were presented
and discussed at the workshop and conclude with a perspective on
future challenges in the field.

Biological evidence for integration of perception
and action in the brain
Foundational anatomical and physiological studies have provided substantial evidence for the integration of motor and sensory functions
in the brain (for a recent review, see Guillery and Sherman, 2011).
Regarding the neuroanatomy of the thalamus and cortex, Guillery and
Sherman have noted that most, if not all, ascending axons reaching the
thalamus for relay to the cortex have collateral branches that innervate
the spinal cord and motor nuclei of the brainstem (see Guillery, 2005).
Similarly, those cortico-cortical connections that are relayed via higherorder thalamic structures, such as the pulvinar nucleus, also branch to
innervate brainstem motor nuclei. Guillery and Sherman thus hypothesize that a significant portion of the driving inputs to thalamic relay
nuclei are “efference copies” of motor instructions sent to subcortical
motor centers, suggesting a more pervasive ambiguity between sensory
and motor signals than has previously been acknowledged.
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“Efference Copies” (von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950), or alternatively termed “Corollary Discharges” (Sperry, 1950), have long
been hypothesized to establish sensorimotor contingencies in perception (for review see, e.g., Poulet and Hedwig, 2007). While the
work of Guillery and Sherman demonstrates the prominence of collateral connections in the anatomy of motor and sensory pathways,
it does not directly implicate these connections in the encoding
of sensorimotor contingencies. Neurophysiological evidence for
motor feedback in sensory processing can be found in the remapping of visual receptive fields (RFs) across several visual and association cortices. For example, during directed saccadic eye movement
tasks, the spatial location of visual RFs of Frontal Eye Field (FEF)
neurons have been demonstrated to shift, prior to saccade, to the
projected post-saccadic target (Sommer and Wurtz, 2008). Building
on these results, Marc Sommer presented evidence that the superior
colliculus (SC), a brain stem nucleus known to play an important role in the generation of eye movements, sends projections
to the FEF via the mediodorsal (MD) thalamus. Consistent with
the hypothesis that this SC–MD–FEF pathway may be carrying
efference copies of saccade motor commands required for accurate
spatial remapping of RFs in FEF, Sommer found that inactivation
of the MD nucleus during behavioral tasks greatly diminishes such
remapping (Crapse and Sommer, 2009). Carol Colby has reported
that efference copy-based remapping is a widespread phenomenon
in the visual system, occurring in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP),
V4, V3A, V2, and possibly even as early in the visual system as the
primary visual cortex (V1; Berman and Colby, 2009). These results
suggest that efference copies find widespread use throughout the
cortex, including early visual cortices.
A clear example of the role of motor pathways in the representation of external objects came from the lab of Ehud Ahissar.
Analyzing the vibrissae system of rats and its role in object localization, Ahissar showed how this inherently active sensory modality is
anatomically organized to form a nested set of hierarchical feedback
loops including sensory and motor circuitry of the brainstem, thalamus, SC, and the cortex (Yu et al., 2006). His lab has provided
behavioral and neurophysiological evidence that object localization
is encoded in the steady-state activation of an entire sensory-motor
loop pathway, with convergence emerging over approximately four
whisking cycles (Knutsen and Ahissar, 2009). This demonstrates,
for one sensory modality, the critical importance of putting motor
action into perception.

Implications of closed action-perception loops for
computational modeling
Two common themes emerged with regard to the implications
of action-perception loops for computational modeling. The first
theme was how embodiment, the opportunities, and constraints
imposed by an agent’s body on motor action and perception,
can shape learning, and facilitate information processing (Pfeifer
and Bongard, 2006). The second theme was that action strategies, through their interaction with the external environment,
can shape the flow of information being processed by an active,
embodied agent.
Josh Bongard argued for an embodied approach to building
robots that explicitly highlights the role of active motor exploration
and morphological factors for aiding or scaffolding sensorimo-

Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience

tor learning, computation, cognitive development, and biological
evolution (Bongard et al., 2006). Bongard’s lab has designed and
constructed robots capable of autonomously generating internal
models for motor control through adaptive exploration of their
own bodily sensorimotor contingencies. Experiments centered on
the these robots have demonstrated that gradual changes to a simulated robot’s physical form across “developmental/ontogenetic”
timescales can facilitate learning of sensorimotor contingencies by
guiding the learning process along a gradual trajectory toward its
mature state. Remarkably, by tying the learning process directly to
exploration of the sensorimotor space, his robots demonstrated
resilience to major morphological changes and were capable of
relearning and adapting their internal self-models after drastic
changes such as damage or loss of limbs.
To achieve an effective internal model, Bongard’s robots generate
a set of “hypotheses” and then choose actions that yield differing
expectations under those “hypotheses.” Thus, the actions of the
robot determine the information it receives and uses to improve its
internal model. This idea of action strategies determining the flow
of information was reiterated frequently during the theoretical neuroscience and cognitive philosophy sessions of the workshop. Each
researcher, however, presented different objectives in the regulation
of information flow by action strategy. Andy Clark, for example,
presented a unifying theory of the predictive brain, in which all
of the brain’s operations can be understood as being optimized to
reduce prediction error (Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2005).
Ralf Der, in contrast, suggested that minimization of post-diction
error, not prediction error, represents a fundamental objective of
behavior (Hesse et al., 2009). Der presented simulated robots that
learned to self-organize toward minimizing post-diction error, an
objective that achieved homeokinesis and yielded a vast range of
coherent and playful behaviors.
Nihat Ay and Keyan Ghazi-Zahedi integrated the themes of
embodiment and control of information flow by suggesting that
a learning agent can export much of its behavioral information to
the external world (Der et al., 2008; Zahedi et al., 2010). Drawing
from the field of Information Theory, they showed that maximization of predictive information, the mutual information between
past and future senses, yielded explorative behaviors across a variety of simulated robots. Interestingly, it has been shown that this
principle of maximizing predictive information proposed by Ay
is mathematically equivalent to the principle of minimization of
post-diction error articulated by Der, thus tying together several
information-theoretic approaches.
While the unified principle presented by Der, Ay, and GhaziZahedi operated on the information flow within a single model
of the world and converged to a single optimal action strategy,
Fritz Sommer, presenting work done in collaboration with Daniel
Little, introduced a different principle that operated on the flow
of information between changing internal models of the world.
As Bongard’s robots choose actions that help them to distinguish
between competing hypotheses, Sommer postulated that choosing
action to maximize the expected gain in internal model accuracy
was a fundamental feature of exploratory learning. Using valueiteration to predict information gains multiple time steps into the
future, he showed that embodied agents could achieve, under this
objective function, efficient learning of the world dynamics (the
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transition probabilities of a Controllable Markov Chain). He also
demonstrated that this efficient learning allowed the agents to
become better navigators of their world.
Daniel Polani further supported the primacy of Information
Theory in modeling action-perception loops in the brain, arguing
that Shannon information is the proper currency of brain function
as it is measured in unitless bits and is coordinate-free. He showed
that, for a given scenario, the total information to be gained or
exploited is invariant, but its actual accumulation can be spread
between sensors or over time. He further suggested that information can measure not only the knowledge to be obtained about
one’s external world (a gain) but also the complexity of the action
strategy utilized to exploit the world (a cost). Incorporating this
cost on decision-making, Polani defined relevant information as the
minimal amount of information required to achieve a certain goal.
In doing so, Polani effectively linked the emerging informationtheoretic approaches to the more classic studies of reinforcement
learning. He also presented the concept of empowerment as an
information-theoretic measure of the impact that an action choice
has on the external world. In simulations, strategies for achieving
high empowerment gave rise to unique behaviors driving agents
toward critical states (such as a pendulum arm balancing in an
unstable upright vertical position; Klyubin et al., 2008).
Concluding the conference, Naftali Tishby further attempted to
unify Information Theory with value-seeking decision principles.
Like Sommer, Tishby argued that information itself is a “value”
and that actions can generate information across a wide range of
timescales, from the immediate to the very distant future. In his
words, “Life is exploiting the predictability of the environment.”
Tishby however considered the value of information within the
context of specific tasks. He suggested that action strategies should
balance the increase of environmental predictability with the maximization of the objective value of a specific task. To that effect he
offered a model that integrates information gain with externally
defined value functions and formulated the “Info-Bellman” equation (Tishby and Polani, 2010), which is an extension of the iterative
Bellman equation from the field of reinforcement learning.
Interestingly, when it comes to predicting and integrating value
(defined by Information Theory) over time, these three researchers
– Sommer, Polani, and Tishby – shared a common approach: By
casting their respective objective functions in terms of the classic
Bellman equations, they were able to use Control Theory to identify optimal action policies. Indeed, Tishby coined the term “InfoBellman” to emphasize how his approach merges Information
Theory and Control Theory.

On the necessity of action in perception
As experimental neuroscientists provide increasing evidence for the
integration of motor and sensory systems in the brains of both vertebrates (see results described in the previous paragraphs, and many
more examples such as: Liberman, 1996, 2010; Eliades and Wang,
2003; Rauschecker, 2011; Scheich et al., 2011) and invertebrates
(e.g., Chiappe et al., 2010; Haag et al., 2010; Maimon et al., 2010;
Tang and Juusola, 2010), and as computational neuroscientists continue studying the theoretical benefits of directly incorporating
actions into computational models of perception, a fundamental
question remains: how inherent are actions in perception? That
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is, to what extent can the neural mechanisms of perception be
understood free of its behavioral context? A lively debate arose at
the conference around this issue. Arguing that actions are necessary for perception, Kevin O’Regan proposed that perception arises
only from identification of sensorimotor contingencies (O’Regan,
2010). In support of this hypothesis, he provided evidence that the
perception of space and of color can both be explained as identification of motor invariants of sensory inputs (Philipona et al., 2003;
Philipona and O’Regan, 2006).
In contrast, Jeff Hawkins argued that much of perception can
potentially be understood without direct consideration of actions.
Toward this end, he presented Hierarchical Temporal Memory
(HTM) networks, inspired by neocortical organization, that were
capable of implementing temporal sequence learning, prediction,
and causal inference all free of any behavioral context (George and
Hawkins, 2009). While he acknowledged the potential information content of actions, he argued that it did not fundamentally
change the basic computational principles of the neocortex. Instead,
Hawkins argued that the motor pathways are one of several means
by which critical temporal information is transferred to the brain,
thereby enhancing the information flow from sensory pathways.
One conclusion to be drawn from Hawkins’ HTM network model
is that sensorimotor interaction with the environment, is, strictly
speaking, unnecessary for learning, perception, and prediction,
because the temporal information required for such capacities is
already included in the sequence of sensory events. Nevertheless,
it remains an important open question whether HTM networks
can accurately model information processing as it is performed
by the neocortex.

Future perspective: toward understanding action–
perception loops in the brain
During the workshop, Ray Guillery pointed out that “frogs can
catch flies,” to emphasize the important fact that the mammalian
cortex evolved in the context of a brain that was already capable
of closing the action–perception loop. This, along with Guillery’s
demonstration that nearly all levels of sensory processing receive
efferent motor commands, suggest that understanding the hierarchy of nested sensorimotor pathways present in the mammalian
brain may provide valuable insights into their function. Studying
how such loops integrate sensation and movement at the lowest
level of the hierarchy, across diverse species, may therefore lead to
an understanding of the foundations upon which more complex
sensorimotor loops, and perhaps even higher level cognitive capacities, are built.
Goren Gordon suggested that the research lines presented at
the workshop could be categorized along an action–perception–
prediction axis, and along an axis describing the degree of hierarchical complexity. Under this framework, the biologically
oriented presentations (e.g., Ahissar, Colby, Guillery, Sherman,
M. Sommer, Colby), captured the hierarchical nature of action–
perception loops, yet lacked predictive capacities. On the other
hand, the computational and theoretical models discussed in the
workshop (e.g., Ay, Clark, Der, Ghazi-Zehadi, Polani, F. Sommer,
Tishby, and O’Regan) were prediction-oriented, but failed to
model more than a single instantiation of the action–perception
loop. Hawkins’ HTM model was an exception that incorporated
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both a hierarchical structure and predictive capabilities, but it did
so while ignoring the role of actions in prediction and perception.
Intriguingly, a multi-hierarchical action–perception–prediction
model remains to be explored in both the biological and computational communities. Toward this goal, empirical data are needed
regarding the neural substrates underlying the predictive capacities
posited by computational and information-theoretic models, as
are testable hypotheses generated in action–perception–prediction
models implementing the hierarchical architecture observed by
empirical studies.

Unification and progression
The hypothetical model outlined in Figure 1 is an attempt to integrate the major themes and concepts presented at the conference. It
provides a framework to consolidate some of the key insights: the
basic constituents are forward and inverse models (Shadmehr and
Krakauer, 2008). A forward model receives the current state and
an efference copy of an action and predicts the subsequent state.

It can thus generate a prediction error, a concept discussed in the
information-theoretic talks. Higher level forward models predict
more complex states. An inverse model, on the other hand, receives
a desired goal and generates a motor command that attempts to
achieve that goal. It is equivalent to the policy described in reinforcement learning and to the anatomical motor regions. Lower
inverse models serve as motor primitives for higher inverse models.
The latter’s “motor command” (solid arrow) is then the activation
of these primitives.
The concept of hierarchies or multiple nested loops, suggested
by Ahissar and Hawkins, is represented in that lower loops send
information to higher ones (dash-dot arrows), whereas the higher
loops send goals or commands to the lower ones (solid arrows).
Efference copies of motor commands from higher motor regions
to lower ones, as suggested by Colby and M. Sommer, are represented by dotted arrows. Information sent from lower forward
models to higher ones (dash-dot arrows) also travels via collaterals
(dashed arrows) to motor regions, i.e., inverse models, and hence
can be considered as efference copies as suggested by Guillery
and Sherman.
As forward models are predictors, their output can correspond
to the prediction error described by Ay, Clark, Polani, F. Sommer,
and Tishby. They influence the policy regions, here described by
the inverse models. Furthermore, changing the policy via the infoBellman equation per Tishby, empowerment per Polani, or information-seeking exploration per Sommer, corresponds to modifying
parameters of the inverse model.
Taken together, this hypothetical model corresponds to the concept suggested by O’Regan and Ahissar, namely that perception is
sensorimotor contingency, or convergence of sensorimotor loops.

Open questions
The conference was a step toward bridging disciplines that are
divided in their conceptual frameworks and methodologies, yet
many open questions remain. In particular, substantial discussion
revolved around how an understanding of the relationship between
action and perception can inform and constrain (1) experimental
design in sensory and motor neuroscience, (2) future theoretical work to model neural systems, and (3) the construction and
design of intelligent machines. The breadth of these applications
alerts us that common metrics must be developed in order to facilitate direct communication between these different fields. Here we
briefly consider several other open questions, which we believe to
be of critical importance.
Figure 1 | A hypothetical model of hierarchical action–perception loops.
Forward models receive the current state (dash-dot arrows) and an efference
copy (dotted arrows) from lower loops and send their predicted state to higher
loops; inverse models receive a copy of the current state (dashed arrows) and
the goal state (solid arrows) from higher loops and send the motor command
to lower loops. The same model can also be interpreted in a different manner:
higher motor regions (inverse models) send motor commands (solid arrows)
to lower motor regions and collateral efference copies (dotted arrows) to
sensory regions (forward models). Lower sensory regions send predictions
(dash-dot arrows) to higher areas and collateral motor commands (dashed
arrows) to motor regions. Hence the ascending predictions (dash-dot arrows)
can be viewed as efference copies of their collaterals (dashed arrows). The
two views emphasize the inability to separate sensory/perception from motor/
action in such hierarchical loops.
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• Is action required for perception? O’Regan suggested that perception requires knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies formed through motor interaction with the environment, and that
our perception of space is itself shaped by the potential actions
one might perform in space. Tishby raised the contrasting proposition that perception lies in the hypothesis generation and
testing done by information gain maximization and hence does
not necessarily require motor action. Also in contrast stood
Hawkins’ model for passively generating sequence-memories
to learn prediction. Is passive exposure to temporally varying
stimuli sufficient to produce a percept, or is voluntary action
mandatory?
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• When are sensory and motor signals no longer distinct?
Guillery hypothesized that thalamic inputs to all cortical
areas carry efference copies of motor commands intertwined with sensory information from receptors. O’Regan suggested perception might be the enactment of sensorimotor
contingencies.
• Which timescales are relevant for the integration of action and
perception? Ahissar proposed that perception in whisking rats
arises after four whisking cycles, i.e., after several hundred milliseconds. Bongard suggested that ontogenetic timescales are
required to build the infrastructure for action–perception loops
How much does our perception depend on the active experience of evolutionary ancestors (phylogenetic timescale), and
how much does it depend on the experience of an individual
(ontogenetic timescale)?
• Is the relationship between Action and Perception invariable?
There are actions that could be considered “directly mapped,”
such as a hand movement whose direction is based on the sensed location of a target such as a coin. However, there are also
responses that could be considered “symbolically mapped,”
such as a hand movement whose direction is tied to the sensed
symbolic value of coin (e.g., left movement if it is heads, right
movement if it is tails). It is known that different brain areas
are involved in the computation of different perceptual attributes, such as location and identity for example (Mishkin and
Ungerleider, 1982), and this might translate as differences in the
brain areas involved in different kinds of responses (Goodale
and Milner, 1992). The question arises if the same perceptual
and motor contingencies apply for directly vs. symbolically
mapped responses.
• Is prediction central to the action–perception framework?
Clark proposed this explicitly, and many others tacitly argued
for this idea. Prediction, predictive coding/remapping (“future
response fields” per Colby and Sommer), and predictive information figured prominently in many of the theoretical models,
especially those incorporating considerations from Markov
Decision theory (Ay, Ghazi-Zahedi, Polani, Tishby, F. Sommer),
and in robotics (Bongard). What are the neural correlates of
these predictive mathematical constructs?
• What are the implications of embodiment on action and perception? Polani showed that the Acrobot, a two-degrees-offreedom simulated robotic arm driven only by empowerment,
reaches the uniquely unstable inverted point, often defined
as the goal for optimal control problems. O’Regan presented
a mathematical model able to learn the dimensionality of real
space only by finding a unique compensable subspace within
the highly dimensional sensorimotor manifold (Philipona
et al., 2003). This suggests that sensorimotor contingencies can
teach the agent about physical space. Can a generalized relationship between information-driven sensorimotor contingencies
and embodiment be formulated?
• How much can be learned from constrained experiments and
simplified simulations? Experimental studies of the mammalian brain often rely on reduced preparations or unnaturally constrained behavior. Likewise, theoretical treatments
and computational simulations often make many simplifying
assumptions. In both cases, the hope is that careful study of
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limited systems will result in findings that are relevant to the full
system of interest. We believe that sensory and motor functions
are highly interdependent, that the brain is a complex network
of interconnected circuits, and that embodiment is vital to interaction with the environment. These beliefs stand in contrast to
the approximations made in most conventional lines of study.
Perhaps collaboration across disciplines and generations of
researchers can push our studies closer to real, intricate, complex phenomena.
We believe that the interaction between experimental-,
computational-, and robotic-oriented researchers can facilitate the understanding of brain function. Roboticists have
used inspiration from neurobiological systems to construct
complex controllers for embodied agents. How might their
insights inform neurobiological experiments? Experimental
neuroanatomy and neurophysiology have provided evidence of
sensorimotor loops and efference copies throughout the brain.
Can these findings further inform theoreticians about how to
model closed action–perception loops? Theoreticians have proposed several elegant models of action–perception–prediction
loops as the basis of animal behaviors. With more regular dialog, could theoretical models be formulated to generate testable
experimental predictions?
The recent workshop on Perception and Action at the Santa
Fe Institute has awakened a welcome dialog between researchers
from a variety of disciplines, and has emphasized the important
interplay between perception and action. Many open questions still
remain, and the field will undoubtedly benefit from further collaboration between these different disciplines, and possibly others.
In our view, the defining accomplishment of the meeting was to
initiate interdisciplinary discussion among modelers, roboticists,
and experimental neuroscientists, and to identify questions and
themes for future exploration.
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